لم تضاعف حكومة التكنوقراط بشكل كبير في مجمل الأزمات التي تمر بها البلاد منذ سنوات كما أنها لم تنجح في الحدّ منها بأي شكل من الأشكال. وبذلك تكون حكومة التكنوقراط قد حافظت تقريبا على نفس مستوى الفشل الذي عرفته البلاد خلال فترة حكومة التكنوقراط في كل القطاعات. ويعيب تونسيون على هذه الحكومة تشدق أعضائها بصفة “الكفاءة” التي اختيروا على أساسها. وفهذه الكفاءات التي فشلت رغم كل ما تملكه من خبرات في حلحلة ولو جزء بسيط من المشاكل التي تمر بها البلاد طيلة السبعة أشهر الفارطة،
What Euchi demonstrates in The Disappointment of the Revolution is the falling short of an effective transitional justice process, a degredation of standards since 2011 that has witnessed the successive criminalization of former regime officials to their pardoning, to the concession of their right to engage in politics. Those who were initially seen as “enemies” of the state have gradually come to be recognized as political equals, now rivals now allies as per the momentary needs of political parties vying for electoral ground.
بعد أن حاولنا في الجزء الأوّل أن نقف على حقيقة الوضع الإقتصاديّ بين مرحلة بن عليّ ومرحلة ما بعد 14 جانفي 2011، وفي الجزء الثاني أن نتناول فترة حكمه من الناحية الحقوقيّة والسياسيّة من خلال استعراض جزء من الانتهكات والاعتداءات التي مارسها بمعيّة الجهاز الأمني على المعارضين لحكمه، سنحاول اليوم أن نسلّط الضوء على الواقع الأمني والسياسيّ في البلاد بعد أن غاب الرئيس الأسبق عن الساحة السياسيّة وبعد أن انعتق النّاس من الخوف والانقماع الذّي لازمهم طيلة عقود.
As much as Tunisia’s initial, post-independence, political transition was influenced by the extent and nature of economic support from the West, the success of the country’s waning post-revolution «democratic transition» is significantly impacted by the same US and EU powers. A misnomer that diminishes the scope and complexity of international alliances and enmities that it encompasses, the Arab-Israeli conflict bears greatly upon Tunisia’s relations with Western democracies, the primary prospective investors and financial backers of political transition in Tunisia for the past half century.
It is perhaps owing to the urgency of his message, the grave threats that political instability in Libya and regional terrorism pose to Tunisia’s political climate in these next three months, the potential dissipation of a democratic alliance in the MENA region, the very straightforward request for military training and equipment, and more specifically twelve Black Hawk helicopters, that Marzouki’s appeal has been so widely diffused across US and international media outlets.
What is pertinent to note is that Marzouki’s request is the precipitous disbursal of materials that the US has already promised Tunisia.
It is the transgression from the notion of censorship as a right and protection against physical and verbal violence that Tunisia’s legislative body must now recalibrate in order to advance in this period designated as democratic transition. That Tunisian law adheres to international standards is not merely insufficient, but ill-fitted, unconstructive, and myopic if compliance with international conventions translates into the copy-paste importation of text and a lack of contextualization and comparative analysis.
The adoption of a charter signifying convergence on the ‘rules of the game,’ is precisely the sort of written agreement recommended by the International Crisis Group for continued, limited consensus that distinguishes healthy political party competition from enmity spurred by the prioritization of personal/partisan gain and power.
Taking an inventory of reports over the past two weeks that convey the clamor and chaos of Tunisia’s party politics gearing up for elections in October, one can appreciate a newfound irony in the attribution of—and the granting of an award for—’consensus’ to the Ennahda (or, for that matter, any other political) party.
بقلم ياسين بلامين، ترجمته إلى العربية محمد سميح الباجي عكّاز تناول تقرير نشرته المجموعة الدولية لمعالجة الأزمات (ICG) في 05 […]
Even consequential economic woes pale slightly as the announcement of fixed election dates has solidified the finite temporality of transition, the imminent fork in the road and the uncertainty of the path towards which the ‘consensus’-driven country is steering—that of gradual progression through reform or stagnancy and gradual regression?
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