Démocratie 299

Circumventing Political Exclusion – RCD After the Revolution and in the Coming Elections

What Euchi demonstrates in The Disappointment of the Revolution is the falling short of an effective transitional justice process, a degredation of standards since 2011 that has witnessed the successive criminalization of former regime officials to their pardoning, to the concession of their right to engage in politics. Those who were initially seen as “enemies” of the state have gradually come to be recognized as political equals, now rivals now allies as per the momentary needs of political parties vying for electoral ground.

Élection à la “proportionnelle au plus fort reste” : mythe, idées préconçues et loi des nombres.

En attendant une analyse plus détaillée sur Nawaat, ce graphique est une démonstration éloquente contre les nombreux “contresens” répétés à satiété concernant le mode de scrutin de 2011 (reconduit pour les élections de 2014). Prochainement, nous nous étalerons sur l’analyse statistique de la proportionnelle au plus fort reste -sans aucun seuil (!)- dans un contexte transitionnel. D’ores et déjà, affirmons que ce mode de scrutin dans ledit contexte transitionnel tunisien s’avère, au regard des contraintes consensuelles, le moins mauvais pour une démocratie en voie d’installation […]

عندما يصبح الصندوق نعشَ الديقراطية الحقة

لعله مما يبدو لأول وهلة من المفارقات الغريبة هذا التعلق اليوم من طرف أحزاب لا تؤمن بالديمقراطية الحقة بآلية من آلياتها، ألا وهي الإنتخابات. فأنت تسمع يوميا الكلام المسهب على ضرورة الإلتجاء للصندوق وحكم الصندوق وكأنه من القرآن المنزل الذي لا مراء فيه. وفي ذات اليوم تصغي لنفس هؤلاء الذين بمجدون هذه الآلية الآتية إلينا من الغرب ينتقدون هذا الغرب ويرفضون فكره ونظرته للسياسة. إنهم لا يأخذون منه إلا ما فسد ويضربون عرض الحائط بما حسن عنده وأصبح نافقا عند من لا ينافق في تلك البلاد.

رسالة الرباط: ماذا لو أن الملك سأل “من سرق الثروة؟”

“أين ذهبت ثروة المغرب، ومن استفاد منها؟”، هكذا صاغ العاهل المغربي سؤاله، معترفا بوجود الكثير من “مظاهر الفقر والهشاشة وحدّة الفوارق الاجتماعية بين المغاربة”، والسبب حسب رأيه هو أن “الثروة لا يستفيد منها جميع المواطنين”، مما دفعه إلى أن يتساءل “باستغراب مع المغاربة أين هي هذه الثروة وهل استفاد منها جميع المغاربة أم أنها عمّت بعض الفئات فقط؟”.

Marzouki’s Request: Rendering a «Possible Foreign Military Sale to Tunisia» Actual and Immediate

It is perhaps owing to the urgency of his message, the grave threats that political instability in Libya and regional terrorism pose to Tunisia’s political climate in these next three months, the potential dissipation of a democratic alliance in the MENA region, the very straightforward request for military training and equipment, and more specifically twelve Black Hawk helicopters, that Marzouki’s appeal has been so widely diffused across US and international media outlets.
What is pertinent to note is that Marzouki’s request is the precipitous disbursal of materials that the US has already promised Tunisia.

ATT and New Cybercrime Draft Law are But Snags in Tunisia’s Threadbare Legislative System

It is the transgression from the notion of censorship as a right and protection against physical and verbal violence that Tunisia’s legislative body must now recalibrate in order to advance in this period designated as democratic transition. That Tunisian law adheres to international standards is not merely insufficient, but ill-fitted, unconstructive, and myopic if compliance with international conventions translates into the copy-paste importation of text and a lack of contextualization and comparative analysis.

Bon pays, Etat fragile : La Tunisie au révélateur des index

Plusieurs études viennent démontrer, aujourd’hui, la position qu’occupe la démocratie tunisienne par rapport à l’ensemble des pays de ce monde. En effet, prenant en compte plusieurs indicateurs, Le « Good Country Index » (l’indice des bons pays) et le « Fragile States index » (l’indice des pays fragiles) situent différemment la place occupée par la démocratie tunisienne au sein du monde.

Good Country, Fragile State, the Arab World’s Sole Democracy : Tunisia by International Measures

Several comparative studies featuring Tunisia have recently caught our attention at Nawaat, and here we reflect on them conjunctively in the context of a sort of comparative examination of our own. The Good Country Index passes as the most engaging for its pragmatic persective and reassuring assertion that the index is one alternative perspective that is to be considered in conjunction other indices and analyses; the Fragile States Index is mildly interesting without presenting any strikingly revelatory insight, while two articles from The Economist that examine the so-called Arab World are flagrantly devoid of research- and critical thinking-based material for relevant, constructive discussion.

Moving the Masses to Reject Terrorism / Register to Vote

The interim government’s approach to addressing terrorism is a continual source of public discontentment, and heightened security issues have directly influenced citizenry’s reticence to participate in political processes, according to several La Presse and Nawaat reports. On the same day that the Ministry of National Defense reported on the Jebel Ouergha explosion, the High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE) announced the markedly low turnout for voter registration.

Rapport de l’International Crisis Group : Eloge du consensus ou la démocratie atone !

Si le rapport de ICG vise, à court terme et sans le dire clairement, la bipolarisation à l’anglaise ou à l’américaine de la scène politique tunisienne, cela nous semble une grave erreur d’appréciation du contexte politique tunisien, risquant d’encourager vers une pente dangereusement “atone”. Et de ce point de vue, nous avons plutôt tendance à faire davantage confiance dans la sagesse, parfois maladroite, il est vrai, des forces politiques tunisiennes qu’à celle ayant inspiré le rapport en question. Et, en définitive, l’ultime garde-fou, en l’occurrence l’opinion publique tunisienne, celle-ci semble avoir toujours réussi, à ce jour, à faire prévaloir cette forme de sagesse collective à chaque étape qui fut cruciale durant ce sinueux chemin de la transition démocratique tunisienne. Ça n’a pas toujours été facile, mais elle y parvient.

Pacte démocratique et syndicats des forces de sécurité.

Quand celle ou celui dont la République a confié une arme et un uniforme se permet publiquement de qualifier de crime les choix politiques des gouvernants ( et ce, par l’entremise de la propagation de ce qui relève du mythe, en l’occurrence la fausse allégation du démantèlement des services de renseignement), c’est que l’ombre de l’infamie du régime policier n’est jamais trop loin !

Tunisia: Harmonizing Politics and Media for and before the Elections

As much as instruments to monitor and ensure transparency and the constitutional operation of state powers and processes, the HAICA and the ISIE are, just several months into their roles, equally accountable for their own transparency and constitutional operation. The next six months will not only measure their competency and capacity to fulfill this dual responsability but will more generally decide the nature and successfulness of elections and the direction of the country through and beyond the transition period.

In the Name of National Security, ATT Poses Threat to Freedom of Expression, Separation of State Powers

Two recent articles from The International Business Times (New York) and Index on Censorship (a London-based organization that works to «protect freedom of expression around the world») resonate with the skepticism in publications from Tunisian media outlets and pose questions pertinent to national controversies that embody the challenges of post-revolution social and political transition.